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THE VOICELESS CITIZENS:
SURROGACY CONTRACTS AND THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
By: Lorena Solis*
ABSTRACT
As reproduction by surrogacy increases, the problems arising from surro-
gacy contracts also increase. Countries around the world are being asked to
solve never-before-seen legal problems arising from surrogacy agreements.
When trying to solve the newly arisen problems, the rights of the child born
from the surrogacy contract tend to be overlooked. Enacted laws try to solve
the enforceability of the contract and protect the rights of the parties in-
volved—such as, who are the legal parents of the child if both sides of the
agreement wish to keep the child.
However, few of these laws address a situation where the opposite is true, a
situation in which neither side wants to keep the child. In these situations, the
primary focus should be the rights of the child, not the rights of the people
involved in the contract. The law should be up to date and ready to protect the
well-being of the child—a person who never asked to be born. Specifically,
rights such as the citizenship of the child, the right to financial support, the
right to inherit, and the right to identity should be protected.
The Comment discusses how prepared U.S. and Texas law is to handle
problems arising from a surrogacy contract in which neither side wants to
keep the child. In this case, a child with intended American parents should
have the right to be a U.S. citizen, the right to receive financial support from a
party involved in the contract, the right to inherit, and the right to know his or
her identity. These problems may not be currently present, but with the in-
crease of surrogacy use, it surely could be an issue in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s world, almost everyone has heard of surrogacy, if not
through personal experience then through a television show or a
movie. Who can forget the famous quote, “I’m having my brother’s
babies” by Phoebe Buffay in the TV show Friends?1 For most people,
however, learning about surrogacy comes from a TV show and never
goes further than that. No one expects to consider surrogacy later in
his or her life, either as a surrogate or as an intended parent. How-
ever, surrogacy has become a massive worldwide business.2 In the
United States alone, it has become a billion dollar industry.3 People
around the world are turning to this method as the only way to be-
come parents or as a way to make some money. It is no longer a mere
episode in our favorite TV show.
Most surrogacy cases go smoothly and according to the terms of the
contract.4 The surrogate mother releases the baby to the intended par-
1. Friends: The One with Ross’s Wedding, Part 2 (NBC television broadcast May
7, 1998).
2. Charles P. Kindregan & Danielle White, International Fertility Tourism: The
Potential for Stateless Children in Cross-Border Commercial Surrogacy Arrangements,
36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 527, 530 (2013).
3. Id. at 530–31.
4. Mark Hansen, And Baby Makes Litigation, 97 A.B.A. J. 53, 54 (2011).
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ents, and they become the legal parents. Usually, if there is a dispute,
it arises when the surrogate mother refuses to give up the child.5 After
nine months of carrying the child in her womb, the surrogate mother
may become attached and want to keep the child; however, the in-
tended parents are not willing to give up the child. But what if, after a
child is born through a surrogacy contract, neither the surrogate
mother nor the intended parents wish to keep the child? That is the
situation that inspired this Comment, Baby Gammy’s case. Baby
Gammy was born from a surrogacy contract made between an Austra-
lian couple and a Thai surrogate mother.6 Baby Gammy was born
with Down syndrome, and the intended parents refused to take him,7
leaving Baby Gammy’s future uncertain.
Some scholars contend that there is a lack of legislation to help pro-
tect the interests of women entering into surrogacy contracts.8 How-
ever, some jurisdictions have enacted legislation in order to protect
the interest of women who volunteer to be part of a surrogacy con-
tract.9 Others have enacted statutes specifying the rights and duties of
each party to the contract,10 presumably to protect the interests of
both sides.
One might argue that a child born through a surrogacy contract has
the same rights as any other child born through natural conception, so
no specific laws protecting the child’s rights are necessary. However,
due to a surrogate child’s unique conception, there are many issues a
surrogate child might confront that a regular child will probably never
encounter. A child born through traditional means, from the moment
of birth, has the right to receive financial support from an adult whom
the law recognizes to have a parent-child relationship.11 Some of that
financial support includes basic things, such as child support, inheri-
tance, and even government survivors’ benefits.12 But for a child born
through a surrogacy contract, establishing a legally recognized parent-
child relationship might not be as simple. One of the parties might
default on the contract, and the battle for child custody can be long. It
could be years before either party has legal possession of the child.
What if both of the parties default on the contract? Is the child still
entitled to recover financial support from either or both parties?
In a gestational surrogacy contract, as many as five different people
can be involved in the conception of a baby: the intended father, the
intended mother, the surrogate mother, an egg donor, and a sperm
5. Browne C. Lewis, Due Date: Enforcing Surrogacy Promises in the Best Interest
of the Child, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 899, 903 (2013).
6. See sources cited infra note 14.
7. See sources cited infra note 14.
8. Lewis, supra note 5, at 904.
9. Id. (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15(b) (West 2012)).
10. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754 (West 2014).
11. See Lewis, supra note 5, at 906.
12. Id.
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donor.13 The number can vary depending on the circumstance, but a
scenario with five different people is possible. After the child is born,
it is important to know the rights of the child in relation to each of the
people involved in the conception.
This Comment will focus on the rights of the child. Specifically, it
will focus on a scenario like that of Baby Gammy, where the child is
not wanted by the surrogate mother or by the intended parents. This
Comment will argue for four different rights to which a surrogate
child should be entitled: (1) the right to be an American citizen if the
intended parents are American; (2) the right to financial support from
a party involved in the contract; (3) the right to inherit; and (4) the
right to identity. United States law will be used when dealing with
federal law, and Texas law when dealing with state law.
II. A SURROGACY CONTRACT
A. Made in Thailand: The Story of Baby Gammy
David and Wendy Farnell, an Australian couple, arranged a com-
mercial surrogacy contract with a surrogate mother, Puttharamon
Chanbua, from Thailand.14 Chanbua became pregnant with twins, a
boy and a girl.15 The boy, Gammy, was born with Down syndrome
and was abandoned by the Farnells.16 When the story came out,
Chanbua claimed the Farnells asked her to have an abortion after dis-
covering one of the twins had Down syndrome.17 Chanbua testified
she refused to have an abortion; abortions are against Chanbua’s Bud-
dhist beliefs and fetal impairment abortions are illegal in Thailand.18
After the twins—Gammy and Pipah—were born, the Farnells took
healthy Pipah to Australia but left Baby Gammy behind.19 Chanbua
claimed the couple abandoned Baby Gammy because he was born
with Down syndrome and only wanted healthy Pipah.20
13. Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law: Disharmony on a Divi-
sive Social Issue, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 465, 465–66 (2006).
14. Thai Surrogate Mother of Abandoned Down’s Syndrome Baby Gammy Told
by Australian Parents They Were “Too Old” to Care for Twins, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 3,
2014, 10:59 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2714811/Parents-old-care-
twins-abandoned-Downs-Syndrome-baby-Gammy.html; see also Thai Surrogate Baby
Gammy: Australian Parents “Wanted Him,” BBC (Aug. 11, 2014), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28732511 [http://perma.cc/F4XL-SG8Q].
15. DAILY MAIL, supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. BBC, supra note 14.
18. Id.
19. Lindsay Murdoch, Wendy Farnell Did Not Supply the Egg, Gammy’s Thai
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According to Chanbua, she was sad and angry at the Farnells21 be-
cause Baby Gammy was their child, yet they refused to keep him.22
Mr. Farnell testified that he was angry at the surrogacy agency be-
cause it did not conduct tests early in the pregnancy to discover the
baby’s condition.23 He stated that if that had been the case, most
likely the pregnancy would have been terminated.24
B. The Problems Presented by Baby Gammy
Baby Gammy’s case gained worldwide attention, causing the Thai
government to look into its surrogacy laws.25 Although this problem is
far from American jurisdictions, an American court could soon see a
similar problem. Baby Gammy was lucky that Chanbua decided to
keep and raise him, but what if neither side would have been willing
to keep the baby after he was diagnosed with a medical condition?
In a case like Baby Gammy’s, does the child have the right to be an
Australian citizen? This could possibly give him advantages, such as
eligibility to Australian health care by right of being a citizen.26 Does
Baby Gammy have the right to obtain financial support from the
Farnells or even the egg donor?27 Similarly, does Baby Gammy have
the right to inherit from the Farnells, the donor, or Chanbua? And,
does he have a right to know how his conception took place when he
reaches an appropriate age?
Most of these problems are not considered until after a case such as
Baby Gammy’s occurs. With surrogacy becoming a billion dollar in-
dustry,28 it is important to have the right laws in place to handle such
situations and make sure the child’s rights are protected.
C. Types of Surrogacy
There are two types of surrogacy contracts: traditional and gesta-
tional.29 In a traditional surrogacy contract, the surrogate mother is
21. Michael Sullivan, Surrogacy Storm in Thailand: A Rejected Baby, a Busy
Babymaker, NPR (Oct. 22, 2014, 4:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/goatsandsoda/20
14/10/22/357870757/surrogacy-storm-in-thailand-a-rejected-baby-a-busy-babymaker.
22. Id.
23. BBC, supra note 14.
24. Id.
25. See Sullivan, supra note 21.
26. Lindsay Murdoch, Thai Surrogate Baby Gammy Could Become an Australian
Citizen, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/na-
tional/thai-surrogate-baby-gammy-could-become-an-australian-citizen-20141122-
11rxci.html.
27. The egg for Baby Gammy’s conception was not provided by Mrs. Farnell but
was donated by a Thai donor. Murdoch, supra note 19.
28. See Kindregan & White, supra note 2, at 530–31.
29. Amanda Mechell Holliday, Who’s Your Daddy (and Mommy)? Creating Cer-
tainty for Texas Couples Entering into Surrogacy Contracts, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1101, 1102 (2003) (citing Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surro-
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also the biological mother of the child.30 The intended parents’ con-
tract with the surrogate mother for her to be artificially inseminated
with the intended father’s sperm.31 The conceived child will not be
biologically related to the intended mother.32
In a gestational surrogacy contract, the process of in vitro fertiliza-
tion is utilized.33 The egg from the intended mother or a third-party
donor is fertilized with the “sperm from the intended father or a third-
party donor.”34 The resulting fertilized egg is then implanted in the
surrogate mother.35 Thus, in this type of surrogacy contract, both or
neither of the intended parents may be biologically related to the
child.
III. RIGHT TO BE A U.S. CITIZEN
Baby Gammy’s case raises an important issue: the baby’s citizen-
ship. In Baby Gammy’s case, an Australian couple hired a Thai surro-
gate mother through an online surrogacy company.36 That raises the
issue of the baby’s citizenship: is he Australian, Thai, or does he have
the right to hold dual citizenship? What if instead of being an Austra-
lian couple, Gammy’s intended parents were American—would
Gammy then be an American citizen at birth under American immi-
gration laws? The U.S. citizenship dilemma may be described using
four different scenarios:
Scenario One: The intended parents are American and hire a surro-
gate mother abroad. The child will be genetically related to both or
one of the intended parents. The child is born abroad.
Scenario Two: The intended parents are from a country outside the
United States, and they hire an American surrogate mother. The child
is born in the United States.
Scenario Three: The intended parents are U.S. citizens and travel
abroad to get an egg and sperm donor. The child is born abroad.
Neither of the intended parents is genetically related to the child, but
the intended mother is also the surrogate mother. Thus, she gives
birth to the child but is not genetically related to the child.
Scenario Four: The intended parents are U.S. citizens. They hire a
surrogate mother abroad, as well as an egg and sperm donor. The
gacy at the Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “Non-Traditional”
Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 674 (2000)).
30. Brittnay M. McMahon, The Science Behind Surrogacy: Why New York Should
Rethink Its Surrogacy Contracts Laws, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 359, 361 (2011).
31. Holliday, supra note 29.
32. See McMahon, supra note 30, at 361–62.
33. Holliday, supra note 29.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1102–03.
36. See source cited supra note 14.
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child is born abroad, and neither parent is biologically related to the
child.
There are two ways a child can become a U.S. citizen at birth: by
being born in the United States; or, if born outside the United States,
the child has at least one parent who is a U.S. citizen and that parent
meets certain residence or physical presence requirements in the
United States.37 Thus, in some of these scenarios, the child’s citizen-
ship status will not be an issue. However, in Scenario Four particu-
larly, the law does not give the child the right to be a U.S. citizen at
birth.
A. Jus Soli: Right of the Soil
When a child is born in the U.S., his right to be an American citizen
by birth is protected by the Constitution, even if the child is born to a
surrogate mother.38 The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
provides that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.”39 Thus, any child born
within the United States is a U.S. citizen, regardless of the nature of
the child’s conception or the nationality of the parents.40
Under this law, a child born under Scenario Two will acquire U.S.
citizenship at birth. It does not matter whether the intended parents
are American or foreign; U.S. citizenship comes from being born in
the U.S.41
B. Jus Sanguinis: Right of Blood
Congress also acted to provide that a child is a U.S. citizen at birth
by right of descent.42 A child with at least one parent who is a U.S.
citizen who “meets certain residence or physical presence require-
ments” is a U.S. citizen at birth.43 The law makes certain requirements
different if the child is born out of wedlock or if the American parent
related by blood is the mother or the father of the child. Overall, how-
ever, if the child is related by blood to at least one parent who is a
U.S. citizen, the child is a U.S. citizen.44
37. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., 12 SCIS POLICY MANUAL, pt. H,
ch. 3, http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volume12-PartH-
Chapter3.html [http://perma.cc/CTQ5-YB68] [hereinafter POLICY MANUAL].
38. Kindregan & White, supra note 2, at 541.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2012).
41. Id.
42. Joanna L. Grossman, Flag-Waving Gametes: Biology, Not Gestational or
Parenting, Determines Whether Children Born Abroad Acquire Citizenship from U.S.
Citizen Parents, VERDICT (Apr. 3, 2012), https://verdict.justia.com/2012/04/03/flag-
waving-gametes [http://perma.cc/RR6S-KAQ8].
43. POLICY MANUAL, supra note 37.
44. Id.
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This law makes it possible for children born abroad to American
parents to be a U.S. citizen.45 Under this law, a child born in a Scena-
rio One situation is a U.S. citizen at birth. This means that intended
parents who hire a surrogate mother abroad but use either the in-
tended father’s sperm or the intended mother’s egg should encounter
no trouble from immigration laws. The child will be biologically re-
lated to at least one of the intended parents and is a U.S. citizen at
birth.
C. Non-Genetic Gestational U.S. Citizen Mother
Until October 28, 2014, a genetic relationship between the parent
and a child born abroad was required.46 However, recently the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) collaborated
with the Department of State to issue a new policy expanding the defi-
nition of “natural parent” for citizenship and naturalization.47 Now, a
“natural mother” or “natural father” is defined as “a genetic parent or
gestational parent.”48 The born-abroad child is a U.S. citizen at birth if
he or she is “[t]he son or daughter of a non-genetic gestational U.S.
citizen mother who is recognized by the relevant jurisdiction as the
child’s legal parent.”49 A “gestational mother” is one “who carries and
gives birth to the child.”50 Under this new policy, the child born
abroad no longer has to be genetically related to a parent, so long as a
gestational mother who holds U.S. citizenship and is the legal parent
at the time of birth in the relevant jurisdiction gives birth to the
child.51
Before the new policy, a child born in a situation like Scenario
Three was not a U.S. citizen at birth because the child was not born in
the United States and was not genetically related to the parents. The
only option for the intended parents was to adopt the child—the child
the intended mother had given birth to! As one can imagine, the pro-
cess of adopting the child added to the expenses already incurred by
the intended parents. However, under the new policy, USCIS has ex-
plicitly addressed this problem. The child is a U.S. citizen at birth if
the intended mother is also the gestational mother and is the legal
parent at the time of birth.52 The process of adopting the child is no
45. See Grossman, supra note 42.
46. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., PA-2014-009, POLICY ALERT:
EFFECT OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (ART) ON IMMIGRATION AND
ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
(INA) (2014), http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Updates/20141028-ART.pdf [http://
perma.cc/NGS6-QCQK] [hereinafter POLICY ALERT].
47. Id.
48. Id.
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longer required. This new policy is opening new options for American
couples in need of artificial reproductive assistance. They can look
abroad without fear of immigration laws or incurring additional
expenses.
D. Scenario Four: The Real Problem
The recent policy change by USCIS is an indication that U.S. immi-
gration laws are moving in a positive direction, but there are still holes
in the laws. Under current immigration laws, the aforementioned Sce-
narios One through Three are not problematic, but there are no laws
that expressly address Scenario Four. Since the child is not genetically
related to the intended parents, the child is born abroad, and the in-
tended mother is not the gestational mother, the child is not a U.S.
citizen at the time of birth.
This does not mean that the child will not obtain U.S. citizenship; it
only means that the parents will have to adopt the child before the
child can become a U.S. citizen.53 Under Scenario Four, a child re-
jected by the intended parents after the child’s birth is not a U.S. citi-
zen, even if the intended parents are American. If the intended
parents reject the child, it is a good indication they will not adopt him,
which would make him a U.S. citizen. The child will instead be a citi-
zen of the country where he or she was born if the laws in said country
allow the child to take the citizenship of the gestational mother. In a
situation like Baby Gammy’s, supposing the intended couple is Amer-
ican instead of Australian, the child is not a U.S. citizen at birth.
IV. RIGHT TO FINANCIAL SUPPORT
Children do not ask to be born. It is the parents, or one parent in
some circumstances, who make the choice to bring a child into this
world. Thus, few would disagree that the person who made the deci-
sion to have the child should be responsible for the child’s financial
support. Legally, a child has the right to be financially supported by
his parents, and the birth parents have the obligation to support the
child.54 “To allow a parent to escape from financial support for a
human being he has brought into this world goes against everything
that defines what it means to be a parent.”55 Following this principle,
should intended parents be required to provide financial support for a
surrogate child, even if they refuse to take the child? In the case of
53. See id.
54. Tiffany Woo, When the Forever Family Isn’t: Why State Law Allowing Adop-
tive Parents to Voluntarily Rescind an Adoption Violate the Adopted Child’s Equal
Protection Rights, 39 SW. L. REV. 569, 575 (2010) (citing In re Baby Boy C., 638
N.E.2d 963, 967 (N.Y. 1994)).
55. Sandra Leigh King, Abandonment: How the Texas Legislature and Family
Court System Fail to Meet the Needs of Texas Children, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 75, 133
(2009).
426 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
Baby Gammy, for instance, should the law require the Farnells to sup-
port Baby Gammy even if his surrogate mother cares for him?
“Children are innocent individuals and their parents’ needs should
be subordinate to the needs of their children.”56 The same should hold
true for intended parents. Like birth parents, they made the decision
to bring a child into this world. Even if the situation changes or they
have a change of heart about being a parent, they should be forced by
law, at the very least, to provide financial support for the child. It is
the child’s right to be provided for by the same people who made the
decision to bring him or her into this world.
Some might argue that the intended parents alone did not make the
decision to bring the child into this world. In a surrogacy contract,
there can be up to five people involved in the process.57 If the in-
tended parents default from taking responsibility, is the surrogate
mother or the donor(s) (egg or sperm) obligated to provide for the
child financially? In order to ensure the well-being of the child, state
law should be clear in establishing who will be responsible for the
child’s financial support in the case of a failed contract.
A. Financial Support from the Donors
Section 154.001 of the Texas Family Code orders either or both par-
ents to pay child support for a child until the age of eighteen or until
the child graduates high school.58 A “parent” is defined as:
the mother, a man presumed to be the father, a man legally deter-
mined to be the father, a man who has been adjudicated to be the
father by a court of competent jurisdiction, a man who has acknowl-
edged his paternity under the applicable law, or an adoptive mother
or father.59
The definition does not explicitly mention donors, intended parents,
or surrogate mothers. Further, section 160.702 provides that a donor is
not a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproductive technol-
ogy.60 A “donor” is defined as “an individual who provides eggs or
sperm to a licensed physician to be used for assisted reproduction,
regardless of whether the eggs or sperm are provided for considera-
tion.”61 This definition specifically excludes “a husband who provides
sperm or a wife who provides eggs to be used for assisted reproduc-
tion; a woman who gives birth to a child by means of assisted repro-
duction; or an unmarried man who, with the intent to be the father of
56. Id.
57. Shapo, supra note 13.
58. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.001(a)(1) (West 2014).
59. Id. § 101.024(a).
60. Id. § 160.702.
61. Id. § 160.102(6).
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the resulting child, provides sperm to be used for assisted reproduc-
tion by an unmarried woman, as provided by section 160.7031.”62
Thus, under current Texas law a child does not have the right to
obtain financial support from an egg or sperm donor even if it is
proven that the two are biologically related. A mere donor does not
have the obligation to support a child born through assisted reproduc-
tive technology. The only way for a donor to be considered a parent
and be financially responsible is to explicitly consent to assisted repro-
ductive technology. In the case of a married man, consent is all that is
required to be considered the legal father.63 In the case of an unmar-
ried man, intent and consent in writing are required.64 If the intent
and consent is not in writing, signed by both parents, the donor is not
the legal father.65
In In the Interest of H.C.S., an unmarried man agreed to provide
sperm for an unmarried woman.66 Later, the man sought to obtain
visitation rights.67 The court found that he was a mere donor because
there was no written agreement stating his intent to be the father.68
Under this holding, it is unlikely that a Texas court would find a donor
to be the legal parent of a child born through surrogacy if the person
only intended to be a donor. If the donors are not found to be the
legal parents, they are not required to pay child support under section
154.001.69
B. Financial Support from the Surrogate Mother
In a valid surrogacy agreement executed in Texas, the parties in-
volved in the contract would have to follow the requirement estab-
lished by section 160.754 of the Texas Family Code.70 If the parties
follow all the steps, deciding who would be responsible for the child’s
financial support, in case of a failed contract, would not be a problem.
Section 160.754(a)(3) explicitly states that the intended parents are
the child’s parents and orders the gestational mother to give up all
parental rights and duties with respect to the child.71 If the parties
follow all the steps required by Texas law, the intended parents are the
62. Id. § 160.102(6)(A)–(C).
63. Id. § 160.703.
64. Id. § 160.7031(a)–(b).
65. In re Interest of H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33, 36 & n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2006, no pet.) (concluding that J.S., an unmarried man who provided sperm used for
assisted reproduction and who did not sign and file an acknowledgment of paternity,
did not have standing to pursue a suit to determine paternity of the child born
through the assisted reproduction).
66. Id. at 34, 36 n.1.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 36–37.
69. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.001 (West 2014). The court may order only
the parents to pay child support. Id.
70. Id. § 160.754.
71. Id. § 160.754(a)(2)–(3).
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legal parents of the child and are responsible for his financial support;
the gestational mother is relinquished from any duties owed to the
child. In a contract that follows all legal requirements, if neither party
wants the child, the surrogate mother is legally free from any duties.72
However, not all surrogacy contracts follow all the requirements
and are legally binding. Section 160.102(6)(B) of the Texas Family
Code excludes a “woman who gives birth to a child by means of as-
sisted reproduction” from the definition of a “donor.”73 And a “gesta-
tional mother” is defined as “a woman who gives birth to a child
conceived under a gestational agreement.”74 Under these definitions,
a gestational mother is not a donor; and under section 160.702 of the
Texas Family Code she is not excluded from being a parent.75 Unlike a
donor, there is not a specific requirement for the gestational mother
to intend to be a parent to deem her the child’s parent.
Section 160.201 of the Texas Family Code provides that the mother-
child relationship is established between a woman and a child by “the
woman giving birth to the child,”76 and there is no additional require-
ment that the woman be genetically related to the child.77 The only
exception to this mother-child relationship is if the child is conceived
through assisted reproductive technology.78 Subchapter I of Chapter
160 “controls over any other law with respect to a child born under” a
valid gestational agreement.79 For the exception to apply, however,
the gestational agreement must satisfy all legal requirements and be
validated by a court.80 But if there is no agreement satisfying Sub-
chapter I, then section 160.201(a)(1) establishes a mother-child rela-
tionship if the woman gives birth to the child and is not rebuttable by
the results of genetic testing.81
In In the Interest of M.M.M., the court found that a surrogate
mother was the mother of a child under section 160.201(a)(1) of the
Texas Family Code, even though she was not genetically related to the
child.82 In this case, a woman gave birth to twins but she was not ge-
netically related to the twins.83 The children were conceived via as-
sisted reproductive technology using an egg donor, and then the
72. See id.
73. Id. § 160.102(6)(B).
74. Id. § 160.751.
75. Id. §§ 160.102(6)(B), 160.751, 160.702.
76. Id. § 160.201(a)(1).
77. In re Interest of M.M.M., 428 S.W.3d 389, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (concluding “that the mother-child relationship is established
by a woman giving birth and is not rebuttable by the results of genetic testing”).
78. Id. at 394–95.
79. Id. at 395 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.752(b) (West 2014)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 392, 396.
82. Id. at 396.
83. Id. at 392.
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fertilized egg was implanted in the woman.84 Further, there was no
written agreement satisfying Subchapter I’s requirement for a valid
gestational agreement.85 The court found that section 160.201 of the
Texas Family Code, which establishes a mother-child relationship if
the woman gives birth to the child, governed under this type of situa-
tion.86 Under this holding, a surrogate mother may be found to be the
legal mother of the child if a valid surrogacy contract does not exist,
even if the surrogate mother and the child are not genetically re-
lated.87 This could give a child the right to financial support from a
surrogate mother if the intended parents refuse or are unable to pro-
vide it.
C. Financial Support from the Intended Parents
As mentioned above, it seems logical to hold the intended parents
responsible for a child’s financial support. They are the primary rea-
son the child was brought into the world. Texas law seems to agree.
Section 160.754(a) of the Texas Family Code authorizes gestational
agreements and provides that the intended parents become the par-
ents of the child.88 Parental rights are transferred when a court vali-
dates the gestational agreement.89 If neither side wants the child but
there is a valid contract under Subchapter I, the intended parents are
likely to be found the legal parents of the child,90 giving the child the
right to claim financial support from them.
If there is not a valid contract, under Texas law the intended parents
are still likely to be responsible to the child for financial support.91
Section 160.762(c) of the Texas Family Code specifically provides that
“a party to a gestational agreement that is not validated as provided
by this subchapter who is an intended parent under the agreement
may be held liable for the support of a child born under the agree-
ment, even if the agreement is otherwise unenforceable.”92 An in-
tended parent will not avoid providing financial support for the child
simply because the contract is not enforceable. Under this section, a
court is likely to find intended parents responsible for financial sup-
port of the child, even if they decide not to take the child.
Further, a man is not allowed to file a petition to terminate the par-
ent-child relationship if the man is the intended father under a gesta-
tional agreement under Subchapter I.93 Taken together, the codes
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 396.
87. Id. at 392, 396.
88. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(a)(3) (West 2014).
89. Id. § 160.753(a)–(b).
90. See id.
91. See id. § 160.762(c).
92. Id.
93. Id. § 161.005(c), (d)(3).
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make it very hard, with or without a valid gestational agreement, for
intended parents to avoid parental duties to the child. Texas law
makes it likely that a child will have the right to recover from the
intended parents even if they refuse to perform their side of the
agreement.
V. RIGHT TO INHERIT
Intestacy statutes favor a person’s “nuclear family, descending and
ascending bloodlines, and then . . . collateral bloodlines.”94 A nuclear
family includes the father, mother, and dependent children.95 “Before
the introduction of reproductive technologies, a presumption of pater-
nity applied when a child was born to a married woman, and a pre-
sumption of maternity was standard.”96 The recent increase of
surrogacy, however, has required the rethinking of what makes a per-
son a father or mother.97 In a surrogacy contract, for example, up to
five different people may be involved in the process of bringing a child
into this world: the sperm donor, the egg donor, the surrogate mother,
the intended mother, and the intended father.98 In a situation with five
people involved, issues can arise regarding inheritance for the child.
But, it could potentially be more problematic when none of the five
people involved in the conception are willing to be the child’s
“parent.”
In order to keep up with the recent increase of surrogacy contracts,
“Texas has taken measures to allow for the creation of legal and en-
forceable gestational agreements.”99 However, Texas intestacy law has
yet to catch up with the modern trend of surrogacy contracts; specifi-
cally, with regard to recognition of non-biologically related children
born under a surrogacy contract not valid under Subchapter I of the
Texas Family Code. In 2013, Texas legislators amended Texas Estates
Code sections 201.051 and 201.052 to include inheritance for children
with intended parents.100 This amendment, however, only addresses
94. Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Re-
productive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1094 (1997).
95. Linda Kelly, Family Planning, American Style, 52 ALA. L. REV. 943, 945
(2001).
96. Catherine Belfi, Note, Birth of a New Age: A Comprehensive Review of New
York Inheritance Law Responding to Advances in Reproductive Technology, 24 ST.
JOHN’S J.L. COMMENT. 113, 122 (2009) (citation omitted).
97. Shapo, supra note 94, at 1098.
98. See Shapo, supra note 13.
99. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754 (West 2014); Julie C. Fletcher, The Inheri-
tance Mess with Texas ART Children: The Simple Fix, 4 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY
PROP. L.J. 151, 153 (2011).
100. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 201.051–.052 (West 2014); Act of May 27, 2013, 83rd
Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, §§ 11–12, secs. 201.051–.052, 2013 Tex. Gen Laws 2737, 2740 (to
be codified as an amendment to Tex. Estates Code Ann. §§ 201.051–.052); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 42(a)–(b) (West 2003) (recodified at TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 201.051
(West 2014)).
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the situation under a valid gestational agreement under Texas law.101
The Texas Estates Code is still silent regarding a child’s right to inherit
under a surrogacy agreement not validated by Texas law.
A. Child’s Right to Inherit Under a Valid Gestational Agreement
Before the 2013 amendments to sections 201.051 and 201.052 of the
Texas Estates Code took effect, even under a valid gestational agree-
ment, the inheritance of a child conceived through surrogacy was not
mentioned in the statutes.102 Before this amendment, a child could
only inherit through his mother if the child was related biologically or
adopted by the mother.103 Thus, if an intended mother was not biolog-
ically related to the child born through surrogacy and she never for-
mally adopted the child, the child could not receive any part of the
mother’s estate under Texas intestacy statutes. Under a valid gesta-
tional agreement, the mother was the legal parent,104 but under the
former Texas Probate Code the child could not inherit. If the intended
mother died intestate,105 the child did not have the right to receive any
part of her estate. Similarly, before the amendment, nothing was ex-
plicitly mentioned regarding a child born with an intended father.106
This means that a child resulting from a gestational agreement could
be kept from inheriting from his own father’s estate if the father died
intestate.107
Effective January 1, 2014, however, section 201.051 of the Texas Es-
tates Code addresses a child with intended parents.108 Now a child can
inherit from his mother if she is his biological mother, his adoptive
mother, or his intended parent as defined by section 160.102 of the
Texas Family Code.109 The only requirement is that the gestational
agreement under which the child was conceived was validated under
Subchapter I, Chapter 160, of the Texas Family Code.110 If the gesta-
tional agreement was valid, this section expressly states that the child
only has the right to inherit from the intended mother and not from




104. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(a)(3) (declaring the intended parents as the
parents of the child).
105. A person dies “intestate” if she dies without a valid will. BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
106. See sources cited supra note 100.
107. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b).
108. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 201.051–.052; Act of May 27, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S.,
ch. 1136, §§ 11–12, secs. 201.051–.052, 2013 Tex. Gen Laws 2737, 2740 (to be codified
as an amendment to TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 201.051–.052).
109. Id. § 201.051.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Similarly, section 201.052 allows a child to inherit from an intended
father if there is a validated gestational agreement under Subchapter
I, Chapter 160, of the Texas Family Code.112 This statute also states
that the child is the child of the intended father only, and not of the
biological father for purposes of inheritance.113 Therefore, if there is a
valid gestational agreement, the child has the right to inherit from the
intended father and not from the biological father.
With regard to the child’s right to inherit, this amendment drasti-
cally changed the rights of children born through a surrogacy agree-
ment. Although it did not expressly address a situation where a valid
gestational agreement does not exist, it avoids disputes in cases where
the intended parents do not have a will but are the intended parents
under a valid gestational agreement. It would be unfair for a child to
be considered the child of the intended parents under a validated ges-
tational agreement but was denied the right to inherit under Texas
intestacy statutes.
B. Child’s Right to Inherit Under an Invalid Gestational Agreement
Even after the 2013 amendments to sections 201.051 and 201.052 of
the Texas Probate Code, the inheritance rights of a child born under
an invalid gestational agreement are still unclear.114 Texas only recog-
nizes gestational surrogacy contracts,115 which must be validated
before they can be enforceable.116 Sections 201.051 and 201.052 of the
Texas Estates Code only protect the rights of children born under a
gestational agreement that has been validated.117 However, they do
not address the child’s right to inherit when a gestational agreement is
not valid. Under such circumstances, it is unclear from whom the child
has the right to inherit. This section of the Comment addresses the
child’s right to inherit under an invalid gestational agreement.
1. Right to Inherit from a “Mother”
Texas Estates Code section 201.051 states that “[f]or purposes of
inheritance, a child is the child of the child’s biological or adopt[ive]
mother.”118 It also allows for a child to be the child of an intended
mother, but only under a valid gestational agreement.119 However, if
the gestational agreement is not valid, the child is only the child of the
biological or adoptive mother for inheritance purposes.120 Therefore,
112. Id. § 201.052(a-1).
113. Id.
114. See id. §§ 201.051–.052(a-1) (requiring that the gestational agreement be vali-
dated under Subchapter I, Chapter 160, of the Texas Family Code).
115. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.752(a)–.754 (West 2014).
116. See id. § 160.762(a) (West 2014).
117. Id. §§ 201.051–.052(a-1).
118. Id. § 201.051.
119. Id.
120. See id.
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a child born through a gestational agreement that is not valid in the
state of Texas only has the option to inherit from a biological mother
or an adoptive mother and maternal kindred.121 This problem can eas-
ily be avoided if the intended or surrogate mother adopts the child or
if she writes a will. However, if neither party to the agreement wants
to keep the child, it is doubtful that the intended mother or surrogate
mother would be willing to write a will for the child’s benefit or to
adopt the child.
Under current Texas law, there is an even more regrettable scenario
where the child will not inherit from the intended mother. For exam-
ple, suppose that Abbey and Brett are intended parents who pay Cas-
sie to be their gestational mother. Abbey and Brett use egg and sperm
donors, but they do not know the identity of the donors. Abbey, Brett,
and Cassie agree to the terms of the contract on their own, and they
never seek legal help to make the agreement valid under Texas law.
They believe everything will go according to their plan and that no
legal help is needed. After nine months, Dylan is born. Cassie relin-
quishes all rights to Dylan, and Abbey and Brett become the parents.
However, they never legally adopt Dylan, nor do they write a will.
After Abbey and Brett die, Dylan will not have the right to inherit
from Abbey. Under Texas law, only the biological mother, the adop-
tive mother, or an intended mother under a valid gestational agree-
ment are “mothers” of a child for the purpose of inheritance.122 Since
Dylan was never adopted and Abbey was not biologically related to
Dylan—and since the gestational agreement was not valid under
Texas law—Dylan will not have the right to inherit from Abbey’s es-
tate. Therefore, under current Texas law, even if the intended mother
happily accepts the child, if there is no valid gestational agreement
then the child can be kept from inheriting his own mother’s estate.
Similarly, in a case like Baby Gammy’s, where the egg donor is un-
known and the child has not been formally adopted,123 the child will
not have a right to inherit from any “mother.” In a case where the
intended mother is also the egg donor, it would not be a problem be-
cause the child is biologically related to the intended mother. But in
cases where there is an egg donor, and the donor is not known, the
child has no legal right to inherit. The only option is to find the egg
donor or be adopted. Therefore, if there is not a valid gestational
agreement, the child will only have the right to inherit from the egg
donor, if known, but not the gestational mother or intended mother.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The egg was provided by a Thai donor. Murdoch, supra note 19.
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2. Right to Inherit from a “Father”
Section 201.052 of the Texas Estates Code reads differently than
section 201.051.124 “For purposes of inheritance, a child is the child of
the child’s biological father” if: (1) there is a father-child relationship
established by section 160.201 of the Texas Family Code; (2) “the child
is adjudicated to be the child of the father by court decree”; (3) “the
child was adopted by the child’s father”; or (4) “the father executed an
acknowledgement of paternity.”125 Under the statutes, the way to es-
tablish paternity for purposes of inheritance is broader than establish-
ing maternity.126 For a child born through an invalid gestational
agreement, the child must prove paternity in accordance with one of
the methods mentioned in the statute.
If the gestational agreement is not valid and neither party wants to
keep the child, then adjudication by a court, adoption by the father, or
acknowledgment of paternity are all unlikely to occur. Establishing a
father-child relationship is the only remaining way to potentially in-
herit from an intended father. Section 160.201 of the Texas Family
Code states that “[t]he father-child relationship is established between
a man and a child . . . [i]f [the man consents] to assisted reproduction
by his wife under Subchapter H,” Chapter 160, of the Texas Family
Code.127 A husband is the father of a child born through assisted re-
production if he “provides sperm for or consents to [the] assisted re-
production by his wife.”128 Consent to the wife’s reproduction must be
in writing, but even if the husband fails to put it in writing, if he treats
the child as his own he is not precluded from being recognized as the
father of the child.129
Therefore, a child born through a gestational agreement does not
have to be related by blood to the intended father, nor be legally
adopted to have the right to inherit.130 However, the intended father
must be married to the intended mother and must have agreed—ei-
ther in writing or by treating the child as his own—to his wife’s repro-
duction through assisted technology.131 Under this statute, even if the
gestational agreement is not valid under Texas law, a child could still
have the right to inherit from his intended father.132 The only require-
124. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 201.051–.052.
125. Id. § 201.052(a); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.201(b) (West 2014).
126. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 201.051–.052.
127. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.201(b) (West 2014).
128. Id. § 160.703.
129. Id. § 160.704(a)–(b).
130. Id. § 160.201(b); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 201.052(a)(1). If there is a father-
child relationship established by section 160.201 of the Texas Family Code, the child
has the right to inherit from the father. Id.
131. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.201(b)(5), 160.703, 160.704.
132. Id.
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ment is that the man agreed to his wife’s reproduction through as-
sisted technology by writing or by treating the child as his own.133
The problem arises when the intended father is not married to the
intended mother and there is no valid gestational agreement. Under
this scenario, if the intended father refuses to keep the child, the child
will likely have no right to inherit. He is not biologically related, he is
not adopted, and no father-child relationship has been established
under section 160.201 of the Texas Family Code.134 In this scenario, it
is not likely that the child will have a right to inherit from the intended
father.
Section 201.052 of the Texas Estates Code states, “[a] person may
petition the probate court for a determination of right of inheritance
from a decedent if the person . . . claims to be a biological child of the
decedent and is not otherwise presumed to be the child of the dece-
dent.”135 Under this statute, a child can claim the right to inherit from
the sperm donor as well, if known. In a case with a sperm donor, how-
ever, the real problem would be finding the donor. If the child does
not know who the sperm donor is, it is highly unlikely he will be able
to inherit.
Although Texas intestacy law is trying to adjust to the new trend of
surrogacy contracts, it has not fully addressed every problem that
could arise.136 Based on current statutes, if an intended father has not
adopted a child or is not biologically related to the child, it will be
difficult for that child to inherit from the intended father if there is not
a valid gestational agreement.137 The only loophole exists when the
intended father is married to the intended mother and he consented to
the reproduction through assisted technology. But if he is not married
to the intended mother, or there is no proof he consented, the child is
not likely to have the right to inherit. Although a child is likely to have
the right to inherit from a sperm donor under the current statute, the
inability to find the sperm donor is likely to handicap that right.138
VI. RIGHT TO IDENTITY
“The question of whether a child has the right to know [his or] her
biological or genetic parents is one of the toughest issues to have risen
over the past twenty years.”139 Knowledge of one’s origins is some-
133. Id.
134. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 201.052; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.201(b)(5).
135. Id. § 201.052(c)(1).
136. Act of May 27, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, §§ 11–12, secs. 201.051–.052,
2013 Tex. Gen Laws 2737, 2740 (to be codified as an amendment to TEX. EST. CODE
ANN. §§ 201.051–.052); see supra Part V.
137. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 201.052.
138. Id.
139. Samantha Besson, Enforcing the Child’s Right to Know Her Origins: Contrast-
ing Approaches Under the Convention on the Right of the Child and the European
Convection on Human Rights, 21 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 137, 138 (2007).
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thing that most people take for granted. But if placed in such a situa-
tion, in which the identity of one’s biological parents is unknown, it is
probable that many people would fight for or demand the right to
know. “Children must move from being the ‘voiceless citizens’ to be-
coming the new kids on the human rights block, and nowhere is that
more important than with respect to rights regarding their biological
origins and biological families.”140
The ethical focus on artificial reproductive technologies—such as
surrogacy—has been almost entirely on adults’ ability to access these
technologies in order to start families.141 Now the focus is shifting to-
ward the children’s rights to know the nature of their conception and
their genetic heritage.142 The Convention on the Rights of the Child
(“CRC”) was “the first legally binding international instrument to in-
corporate the full range of human rights—civil, cultural, economic,
political, and social—to protect children (defined as persons under the
age of eighteen).”143 It was the first document to recognize a child’s
right to his identity.144 Specifically, the CRC is the first document to
explicitly recognize a child’s, not an adult’s, right to know his iden-
tity.145 Article 8 states:
1. States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to pre-
serve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family re-
lations as recognized by law without unlawful interference.
2. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements
of his or her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assis-
tance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or
her identity.146
Article 8 does not define the term “identity.”147 Instead, three ex-
amples of what constitutes “identity” are given: “nationality, name,
and family relations.”148 However, “family relations is usually inter-
preted as going beyond knowing one’s legal parents and extending to
biological and birth parents.”149 Thus, it stands to reason that a child
must have the right to know the identity of his birth and biological
parents.
140. Margaret Somerville, Children’s Human Rights to Natural Biological Origins
and Family Structure, 1 INT’L J. JURIS. FAM. 35, 37 (2010).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Brigitte Clark, A Balancing Act? The Rights of Donor-Conceived Children to
Know Their Biological Origins, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 619, 625 (2012).
144. Besson, supra note 139, at 143.
145. Id. at 139.
146. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 8, opened for signature Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC].
147. Id.
148. Clark, supra note 143, at 627.
149. Id.
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A. Genetic Orphans: The Struggle of Donor-Conceived Children to
Find Their Biological Parents
A growing number of adults conceived through artificial insemina-
tion with the help of donors are looking for their genetic parents and
“speaking out against the practice of keeping secret the means of their
conception.”150 “Genealogical bewilderment,”151 often associated with
an adopted child’s identity confusion resulting from not knowing his
or her origins, is now sometimes associated with children who were
conceived with the help of donors.152 The resulting state of confusion
and uncertainty experienced by a genealogically bewildered child un-
dermines his security and affects his mental health.153 “Our sense of
who we are is bound up with the story we tell about ourselves . . . . If
the biological parents are not known, it ‘is like a novel with the first
chapter missing.’”154 The following are only two stories from a web-
site full of stories by donor-conceived children sharing their stories of
how they desperately seek to know their biological parent or parents.
I often wonder who you are. What is your name? Are you even
still alive? The immutable power of these eternally unanswerable
questions gradually consumes my soul. . . . Simply the pleasure of
knowing you exist somewhere in this universe does not bandage the
wound of your absence.
I often wonder who I am. My family tree is severed in two—I am
denied your half, its branches rich and strong with stories I will
never be told. I wander aimlessly, never truly knowing the roots of
my heritage, my nationality ambiguous and fluid.155
It came from out of the blue, because I have done genealogy for the
last 20 years, and very recently decided to take a DNA test. . . . It’s
always on my mind. Always. The worst part that I see so far, is that
no one in my circle of family and friends even has the slightest clue
as to what I am feeling. . . .
. . . The unfortunate part is that now, all the pain and misery is
heaped on me. Knowing what I know now, I strongly believe that
[s]perm [d]onation HAS to be an open procedure. That the child
should have full access to the donor’s information. It’s the only
moral thing to do.156
150. Shapo, supra note 94, at 1119.
151. A genealogical bewildered child is one who either has no knowledge of his
natural parent or only uncertain knowledge of them. Kimberly Leighton, Addressing
the Harms of Not Knowing One’s Heredity: Lessons from Genealogical Bewilderment,
3 ADOPTION & CULTURE 63, 64 (2012).
152. Shapo, supra note 94, at 1117.
153. Leighton, supra note 151, at 96.
154. Shapo, supra note 94, at 1117.
155. A Letter to Dad on Father’s Day, ANONYMOUS US, http://anonymousus.org/a-
letter-to-dad-on-fathers-day/ [http://perma.cc/LKV8-N9LN].
156. I Found out a Little Too Late, ANONYMOUS US (July 31, 2012), http://
anonymousus.org/i-found-out-a-little-too-late/ [http://perma.cc/3TP6-DVLZ] (altera-
tion added).
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According to one scholar:
Anticipated consent requires that when a person seriously affected
by a decision cannot give consent, we must ask whether we can rea-
sonably anticipate they would consent if able to do so. If not, it’s
unethical to proceed. So ethically, we must listen to what donor-
conceived adults are saying . . . .157
They . . . tell us of their profound sense of loss and genetic iden-
tity . . . .158
It is one matter for children not to know their genetic identities as
a result of unintended circumstances. It is quite another matter to
deliberately destroy children’s links to their biological parents
. . . .159
The right to know one’s biological parents should not be decided by
someone else on one’s behalf.160 One of the most fundamental human
rights of all is a child’s right with respect to his biological parents, and
that right must be recognized.161 Children conceived by a surrogacy
contract should, at the very least, know how they were conceived.
Baby Gammy should be guaranteed the right to know his story and
that somewhere in Australia he has a twin sister.
VII. MEANINGFUL CHANGE
A. Include “Intended Parent” as Part of “Natural Parent” for
Immigration Purposes
After USCIS’ recent change to expand the definition of “natural
parent” to include gestational mothers for immigration purposes, it
has been argued that the laws are facilitating the selling of U.S. citi-
zenship.162 U.S. citizens are alleging that people around the world will
hire American gestational mothers in order for their child to be U.S.
citizens, and later, after reaching age of majority, the child will apply
for his parents to migrate to the United States.163 It is safe to assume
that there will be public outrage if the USCIS amends the law to allow
a child born from a surrogacy contract who is not biologically related
to the intended parents to be a U.S. citizen. However, these critics are
overlooking the problem presented by cases such as that of Baby
Gammy. Baby Gammy was born with health problems and aban-
doned by his intended parents.164 The surrogate mother, someone
157. Somerville, supra note 140, at 42.
158. Id. (alterations added).
159. Id. at 44.
160. Clark, supra note 143, at 659.
161. Somerville, supra note 140, at 35.
162. See Neil Munro, Obama Administration Allows Fertility Clinics to Sell US Citi-




164. See sources cited supra note 14.
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who never intended to keep the child, was left with the responsibility
of providing financial support and health care. If the law explicitly
gave Baby Gammy the right to be an Australian citizen at the time of
his birth, Baby Gammy could possibly have the right to travel to Aus-
tralia and take advantage of Australian health care.165 Similarly, if
American intended parents contracted for the conception of a child
through surrogacy, the child should have the right to be a U.S. citizen.
Under current laws, if a U.S. citizen has a child by natural means
abroad, that child is a U.S. citizen.166 However, if a child is born
through a surrogacy contract entered into by the intended parents,
that child does not have this same right.167 The child must be biologi-
cally related to the parents or the intended mother must also be the
gestational mother.168 But the truth of the matter is that if a child is
born through a surrogacy contract, it is only because the intended par-
ents sought to have a child. The intended parents agreed to the con-
tract; they were the ones who started the whole process. In the same
way that two people have the choice to conceive a child through natu-
ral means, they also have a choice to conceive a child by entering into
a surrogacy contract. In both cases, the child is born because someone
made the choice to conceive a child. One child should not have fewer
rights than the other. In neither case was the child more or less the
child of the American parents than the other.
Further, even if the intended American parents decide to keep the
child, they are at a disadvantage with the current law. If the child is
not biologically related to the intended parents, they will have to
adopt the child in order for the child to be a U.S. citizen. This adds
unnecessary expenses to an already expensive process.
Although the USCIS is taking notice that current laws need to be
changed to accommodate children born through a surrogacy pro-
cess,169 it has left out an important right for surrogate children. In or-
der to protect the rights of a child born with intended American
parents, the USCIS needs to expand the definition of “natural parent”
to also include an intended parent. For people who will oppose this
change because they believe it would facilitate the selling of U.S. citi-
zenship, the child will have American “parents,” which means the
child will not be used as bait to later bring the parents to American
soil; the intended parents are already American.
165. Murdoch, supra note 26.
166. See Grossman, supra note 42.
167. See POLICY MANUAL, supra note 37, at pt. H, ch. 2.
168. Id.; see supra Sections III.B–C.
169. Recently, the USCIS expanded the definition of “natural parent” to include
gestational parent. See POLICY ALERT, supra note 46.
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B. Clarification of Financial Support Under an Invalid Agreement
In order to avoid confusion and protect the right for financial sup-
port of the child, the Texas Legislature should clarify who is responsi-
ble for paying financial support in case of an invalid agreement. It is
clear that under a valid gestational agreement, the intended parents
are the child’s parents and would be responsible for paying financial
support.170 But the only attempt by the Texas Legislature to allocate
financial responsibility under an invalid agreement is found in section
160.762(c) of the Texas Family Code, which states that “[a] party to a
gestational agreement that is not validated as provided by this sub-
chapter who is an intended parent under the agreement may be held
liable for the support of a child born under the agreement, even if the
agreement is otherwise unenforceable.”171 Although this is a notable
improvement, it is still subject to confusion and court interpretation,
as the section does not explicitly mention when or under what circum-
stances intended parents may be liable for support of the child.
An amendment to this statute specifying that intended parents who
enter into an invalid gestational agreement and then refuse to care for
the child would be liable for financial support of the child will solve
problems like the ones presented by Baby Gammy’s case. Even if the
intended parents refuse to take the child, the proposed amendment
ensures the child will have the right to financial security. Amending
the statute will give a surrogate child the same right that a child born
from natural conception has from his biological parents—the right to
claim financial support from day one.
C. Amending the Law to Allow Inheritance from an Intended
Parent Under an Invalid Agreement
As the Texas Legislature needs to address the right for financial
support, the legislature also needs to address the inheritance rights of
a child born through a surrogacy contract not valid under Texas law.
In 2013, sections 201.051 and 201.052 of the Texas Estates Code were
amended to include that a child has the right to inherit from the in-
tended parents if there is a valid gestational agreement.172 But the
Code does not address a case in which a valid gestational agreement
does not exist.173
As discussed in Section B, a child may not be able to inherit from
the mother’s estate if the child was not biologically related or legally
adopted, or a valid gestational agreement never existed.174 The right
of a surrogate child to inherit from his father’s estate is also unclear
170. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(a)(3) (West 2014).
171. Id. § 160.762(c).
172. See sources cited supra note 100.
173. See sources cited supra note 100.
174. See supra Section V.B.1.
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where there is no valid gestational agreement.175 A simple amend-
ment to the statute allowing inheritance for a child with intended par-
ents regardless of whether there is validated gestational agreement
under Subchapter I, Chapter 160, of the Texas Family Code could
solve many of these problems.
People could argue that the premise behind the Texas Estates Code
is “testamentary freedom” and that forcing inheritance rights upon
the intended parents after they refuse to take the child violates that
premise. However, if the intended parents wish to keep the child from
inheriting their estates, the intended parents could write the child out
of their wills, as parents do when they wish to disinherit their children.
This is especially true since the intended parents chose to use anony-
mous sperm/egg donors, robbing the child of the possibility to inherit
from his biological parents. In order to protect the child’s right to in-
herit, it is important that the Code allow the child to inherit from in-
tended parents, even under an invalid gestational agreement.
Amending the law would solve three problems: (1) when the intended
parents refuse to take the child; (2) when the intended parents take
the child but never formally adopt the child; or (3) where there is no
validated gestational agreement.
D. Banning Anonymity but Leaving the Decision of Disclosure to
the Intended Parents
The right of children to know their genetic origins rests on the in-
tended parents’ decision to disclose the nature of their children’s con-
ception.176 “[T]he onus of revealing the manner of conception rests on
the social parents, unless such information is disclosed by the state,
such as through a birth certificate, or it is obvious that they cannot be
the biological children of their social [parents].”177 However, “placing
greater pressure on the social parents via a legal responsibility to dis-
close . . . could constitute . . . an invasion of the [intended] parents’
privacy rights . . . .”178 Thus, regulating the child’s right to an identity
or to know the nature of his or her conception is a complicated
matter.
However, some countries, including England and Sweden, have de-
cided to ban gamete donation anonymity.179 In Sweden, a donor-con-
ceived child has the right to know about the use of donor insemination
and the donor’s identity but not until he reaches a mature age.180 A
study conducted two decades after the introduction of this legislation
indicates that parents are becoming more comfortable in disclosing
175. See supra Section V.B.2.
176. Clark, supra note 143, at 622.
177. Id. (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 659.
179. Id. at 635.
180. Id.
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the use of donors to their children.181 Moreover, an increasing number
of clinics in the United States “offer recipients the choice of gametes
from donors who agree to be identified.”182 “The donor contractually
permits the clinic to release identifying information to the resulting
child, if the child asks for it.”183
This Comment does not propose that the law should force intended
parents to disclose the nature of a child’s conception to a child born as
a result of a surrogacy agreement. However, this Comment does pro-
pose that, if the intended parents decide to disclose this information
and the child then decides to search for the child’s biological parents,
the child should have the right to receive information about the do-
nors and the gestational mother. Following Swedish law, the child
should only receive the information when he is “sufficiently ma-
ture.”184 Thus, the decision should be left to the intended parents, but
where they decide to disclose, the law should facilitate the child’s abil-
ity to obtain the information.
This could be done by banning gamete donor anonymity as in Swe-
den and England.185 In order not to discourage gamete donation, the
law should only require identifying information while enacting stat-
utes establishing that the donors and surrogate mother are not the
legal parents of the child186 and have no legal responsibility. This way,
the intended parents’ privacy rights are protected, but the child has
the right to receive the information if the intended parents choose to
disclose it.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With surrogacy becoming a billion dollar industry, problems are
bound to arise with regard to surrogacy contracts. Problems like the
ones presented in Baby Gammy’s story may not be a current problem
in the United States, but they could occur in the future.187 The ethical
focus on artificial reproductive technology such as surrogacy has been
focused almost entirely on adults being able to access these technolo-
gies188 and not on the rights of the child conceived from these meth-
ods of reproduction. It is time that children born from surrogacy
contracts are no longer kept voiceless citizens, and for their rights to
be recognized.
By the nature of their conception, these children could confront sit-
uations that other children are not likely to encounter. It is important
181. Id.
182. Id. at 639.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 635.
185. Id.
186. See Shapo, supra note 94, at 1120.
187. Kindregan & White, supra note 2, at 530–31.
188. Somerville, supra note 140.
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that their rights are protected when such situations arise. As discussed
in this Comment, the United States, and Texas specifically, are amend-
ing laws and regulations to solve certain problems created by surro-
gacy but have not fully protected the children’s rights in every
situation.
It is important that laws be updated to protect the rights of surro-
gate children when situations such as Baby Gammy’s arise; specifi-
cally, rights such as the child’s right to be an American citizen when
the intended parents are American, the right to financial support, the
right to inherit, and the right to identity. Surrogacy contracts will inev-
itably bring many problems not yet seen in the United States, and the
law must be prepared to address such problems, especially when the
people impacted are innocent human beings.
